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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact of domestic advisors on M&A transactions. The impact 
of investment banks on M&A transactions has been studied since 1990 and the main 
discussion has been the impact of advisors’ reputation on the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) of the acquirer. 
There is gap in the literature in terms of domestic advisors and the period of analysis of 
post-financial crisis. This study will attempt to fill this gap by testing the impact of 
domestic advisors on M&A transactions during the period 2008-2015.  
The main findings of this study suggest that domestic advisors on the target side have a 
positive impact on returns earned by the acquirer. Our findings suggest that an acquirer 
should be advised by a mixed team with, at least, one domestic advisor and one top-tier 
advisor, in order to maximise their returns. 
The results of our study may be useful for acquiring firms, suggesting that domestic 
advisors could have relevant and value-added specific expertise in their countries 
regarding M&A transactions. 
Key words: Financial Advisor, Reputation, Gains, Mergers and acquisitions. 
JEL classification: G24, G34 
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Abstract in Portuguese 
Este estudo visa analisar o impacto de assessores domésticos nas transacções de fusões 
e aquisições O impacto dos bancos de investimento nas fusões e aquisições tem sido 
alvo de estudo desde 1990 e a principal discussão prende-se com o impacto da 
reputação dos assessores nos retornos da empresa adquirente.  
Existe um gap nas literatura em termos do assessores domésticos e o período de analise 
pós-crise. Este estudo irá completar este gap testando o impacto dos assessores 
domésticos nas fusões e aquisições durante o período 2008-2015.  
Os principais resultados deste estudo indicam que os assessores domésticos da empresa 
alvo têm um positivo impacto nos retornos da empresa adquirente. Os nossos resultados 
sugerem que uma empresa adquirente deve constituir uma equipa de assessores mista 
com, pelo menos, um assessor doméstico e um assessor top-tier, de forma a maximizar 
os retornos.  
Os resultados deste estudo poderão ser úteis para as empresas adquirentes, sugerindo 
que os assessores domésticos têm um conhecimento especializado no que diz respeita 
aos seus países que acrescenta valor no domínio das fusões e aquisições. 
Palavras chave: Financial Advisor, Reputation, Gains, Mergers and acquisitions. 
Classificação JEL: G24, G34 
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1. Introduction 
There is a strong interest in the literature regarding advisor reputation and their impact 
on M&A transactions. The impact on transactions is usually measured by Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the acquirer. The first studies (Bowers and Miller, 1990; 
Micheal et al., 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000) found no evidence of the 
impact of advisor reputation, e.g. firms advised by top-tier advisors do not generate 
greater returns than otherwise. However, Kale et al. (2003) changed this paradigm, 
introducing different methodologies to measure the reputation and returns, and 
concluded that advisor reputation has an impact on returns.  
This study will attempt at filling a gap in the literature in terms of domestic advisors and 
the period of analysis (post-financial crisis). The recent studies support the results of 
Kale et al. (2003) but they only focus on top-tier advisors, non-top tier advisors, in-
house transactions and boutiques. This study will complement the literature with the 
impact of domestic advisors on M&A transactions during the period 2008-2015 (post-
financial crisis). The period of analysis is important because the most recent study 
covers a period up only until 2009 and there is still a lack of studies that analyse the 
post-financial crisis.  
In order to test the impact of domestic advisors on M&A transactions we used a sample 
of 481 transactions between listed companies only. We examined our hypothesis using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with Cumulative Abnormal Returns as the dependent 
variable.  
The results of this study seem to prove that domestic advisors on the target side have a 
positive impact on returns earned by the acquirer and suggest that an acquirer should 
create a mixed team of advisors with, at least, one domestic advisor and one top-tier 
advisor, in order to maximise their returns. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: section 2 will present the literature 
review, which includes theoretical background, main theories, characteristics of 
previous studies, hypotheses and testable empirical implications. Section 3 will present 
the data and methodological aspects of our study. The last section of this study includes 
the results and conclusions where the main findings are summarised.   
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2. Theoretical background, literature review and hypotheses 
development 
In this section we will cover the previous studies on the relation between advisor 
reputation and abnormal returns earned by acquirers. This part will conclude with 
hypotheses development. 
2.1.  Overview 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is one of the most important activities in corporate 
finance because it involves vast amounts of money and can have a huge impact on the 
companies involved and the economy. Lehn and Zhao (2006) argued that a bad 
acquisition increases the CEO’s risk of being fired.  
The total M&A deals in 2014 amounted to 3.5 trillion dollars worldwide which 
represents very significant investments in many different countries.  
Investment banks, acting as financial advisors, are important players in the M&A 
market because they provide relevant services to support the firms’ decisions and they 
also have a significant interest in this market due to the high amounts of advisory fees 
paid by the companies. 
 
2.2. Theoretical background 
The first models with the relationship between reputation, quality, and price were 
proposed in the classic work of Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen 
(1984). These models are based on a scenario in which a producer sells its products in 
the market. When the quality of the product can only be observed after the purchase, a 
signal of high quality is assessed with a premium price. Basically, this premium exists 
to compensate the seller for the resources expended in creating its reputation.  
These models are related to product markets but are also applicable to the case of 
investment banking services. The quality of these services is assessed with the track 
record and/or performance of each investment bank. The investment banks need to sell 
their services to the clients and they use this information to improve their chances to 
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become the advisor for a specific transaction. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) 
proposed a model in which they estimated this relationship, specifically for the 
investment banking function, concluding that high-reputation investment banks provide 
higher-quality services and charge higher fees.   
 
2.3. Main theories –Advisors reputation on M&A transactions 
In the literature, the relationship between investment banks and M&A transactions has 
been studied since 1990 and the aim of each study is to find empirical evidence of 
advisor reputation on M&A transactions.  
The first empirical studies regarding this topic found no evidence between financial 
advisors’ reputation and the returns earned by acquirers. Bowers and Miller (1990) 
found no evidence between the market value and the choice of investment banks by 
either acquirer or target. However, their results seem to prove that the total wealth 
gained from the transaction is greater when both (acquirer and target) employ first-tier 
investment banks. Michel et al. (1991) concluded that Drexel Burnham Lambert, the 
least prestigious investment bank in their sample, achieves better Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) than the ‘bulge bracket’ banks 1. With these results they argued that the 
reputation of investment banks is not related to performance. Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
had a similar conclusion when they examined the role of investment banks in U.S. 
transactions, analysing the main determinants to choose an investment bank, over the 
period 1981 to 1992. 
Despite the similar conclusion, Rau (2000) stated that it was important to define the 
bank market share, one measure of reputation, which he concluded as being positively 
related to the success fees charged by the bank and the percentage of deals completed in 
the past. According to this study, the author argued that the bank market share is not 
related with the performance of acquirers that the bank has advised in the past.  
Kale et al. (2003) published the first study that found evidence between financial 
advisor reputation and wealth gains in a corporate takeover context. Their work was 
                                                          
1
 Term used in the literature to describe the most prestigious and profitable investment banks 
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essential to introduce and discuss different approaches and methodologies for 
reputation, in which they defined a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor, i.e. 
the ratio of reputation of the acquirer advisor to reputation of the target advisor. The 
relative reputation of the advisor takes into account the bargaining effect. They 
concluded that the absolute and proportional wealth gains are higher when the 
companies have more prestigious advisors. The second study that found evidence 
between financial advisor reputation and returns earned by acquirer was published by 
Ismail (2010). This work showed evidence that the target seems to generate larger gains 
with tier-one investment banks. Additionally, the author concluded that if a prestigious 
advisor is at least on one side of an M&A transaction, this results in higher combined 
wealth gains.  
With a different methodology than previous studies, Bao and Edmans (2011) concluded 
that investment banks matter for M&A outcomes. They identified a significant bank 
fixed effect on acquirers’ returns. Basically, they argued that some banks are better than 
others at creating value for their clients. The authors criticised the previous studies 
because these attributed a deal’s CAR entirely to the bank but if one does not have a 
link between financial advisor reputation (market share) and outcomes, it does not mean 
that banks do not matter for M&A outcomes. In their study, the authors attributed the 
entire CAR to the role of investment banking (for example, bank-initiated deal/standard 
client-initiated deal/fixated client deal/passive-execution). Additionally, they argued 
that clients can predict the positive association between some banks and high returns 
using past performance.   
Andrey et al. (2012) studied different types of acquisitions separately because they 
argued that reputation is not equal among all transactions and “its effect is more 
pronounced in situations that create relatively larger reputational exposure”, e.g. public 
acquisitions require more skills on the part of the advisors because the transaction 
between two public firms is more complex (due to regulatory approvals, public 
information, etc.) than unlisted firms. Based on these arguments, they concluded that 
advisor reputation is more important in acquisitions of listed firms than unlisted firms. 
Finally, in recent years the popularity of “boutique” advisors has grown because they 
are known for their independence as financial advisors and for their expertise in certain 
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sectors or industries. Song and Wei (2013) published the first study that compares the 
characteristics of a deal between boutique advisors and full-service banks
2
. They 
concluded that the use of boutique advisors tends to be verified in the following three 
conditions: 1) when the deal is small; 2) when the transaction is hostile; and 3) when it 
is a stock transaction as opposed to a pure cash offer. In terms of expertise and 
specialisation in a certain industry, they identified these characteristics in deals advised 
by a team composed of both advisors (boutique advisors and full-service advisors).   
In our study we expect to find evidence of a relationship between domestic advisors and 
returns earned by acquirers because these advisors know the regulatory requirements in 
detail, the economy and the business culture of their country, among other factors. 
 
2.4. Characteristics of previous studies 
As noted earlier, several authors examined the impact of financial advisor reputation on 
M&A transactions. The following tables show an overview of characteristics of the 
previous studies that found evidence about the impact (or no impact) of the reputation 
on M&A transactions, including the period of analysis, sample size, methods and 
dependent variables. 
Table 1. Previous studies that found no relation between financial advisors reputation 
and acquirer returns on M&A transactions 
Authors and year Period Sample Methods Dependent Variables 
Bowers and 
Miller (1990) 
1981-1986 
114 
transactions 
Multiple 
regressions 
 
Target Firm (First-Tier or 
Second-Tier), Bidding firm 
(First-Tier or Second-Tier), 
Av. Market value of Equity, 
Abnormal Returns 
 
Micheal, Shaked 
and Lee (1991) 
1981-1988 
 
112 are 
acquired 
firms 
81 are 
acquirers 
 
Multiple 
regressions 
CARs 
Av. Deal size 
Investment Banks 
                                                          
2
Designation for standard investment banks that have all activities as sales, trading, underwriting, 
research, and lending (Song and Wei, 2013) 
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Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) 
1981-1992 
198 
transactions 
Multiples 
regressions 
Type of acquisition, Hostile, 
Acquirer not first bidder, 
Cash payment, Deal size, 
Relative size, Number of 
prior acquisitions, Related 3-
digit, Number of SICs of 
target, Insider ownership 
Rau (2000) 1980-1994 
2.683 
mergers and 
483 tender 
offers 
Multiple 
regressions 
Type of advisor (bulge, 
major, third-tier, not ranked), 
CARs, Completed deals, 
Hostile deals, Challenged 
deals, Stock financed deals 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the previous studies that found no relation between financial 
advisors’ reputation and acquirer returns on M&A transactions. We use this table to summarise the 
studies in terms of the period of analysis, the number of observations/sample, the methodologies and all 
variables included in the model.  
 
Table 2. Previous studies that that found relation between financial advisors’ reputation 
and acquirer returns on M&A transactions 
Authors and year Period Sample Methods Dependent Variables 
Jayant R. Kale, 
Omesh Kini, and 
Hariey E. Ryan, 
Jr. (2003) 
1981-1994 
324 
transactions 
Multiple 
regressions 
Dollar-denominated wealth 
gains, Strategic, Complexity, 
Hostile Target, Offer Includes 
Stock, Multiple Bidders, 
Bidder Toehold (%), Target 
insider, Ownership (%), 
Bidder Insider, Ownership 
(%), Target (Bidder) Size, 
Target Size ($ m.), Bidder 
Size ($ m.), Target Prior 
Experience, Bidder Prior 
Experience, Related Business, 
No. Target SIC codes, No. 
Bidder SIC codes 
Ismail (2010) 1985-2004 
6.379 U.S. 
M&A deals 
OLS 
regression 
Abnormal dollar gains, Deal 
size, Type of advisor (tier-
one, tier-two, undisclosed or 
in-house), Shares or cash, 
Public or private, Industry 
relatedness, National, Hostile, 
Relative size, Toehold 
Bao and Edmans 
(2011) 
1980-2007 15.344 deals 
Bank fixed 
effects 
CARs, Tobin's Q, Runup, 
Leverage, FCF, Size (Total 
assets), Herfindahl, Sellexp 
(selling expenses over sales), 
Inst (common shares owned 
by institutions), Opperf 
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(operating performance), 
Insider ownership, AcqSIC 
(acquirer SIC code), Repeat 
acquirer 
Andrey, 
Petmezas, and 
Travlos (2012) 
1996-2009 4.803 deals 
OLS 
Regression 
Type of advisor (top-tier or 
non-top-tier), Size, Book-to-
market, Sigma, Runup, 
Leverage, Cash flows-to-
equity, Deal value, Relative 
size, Public or private deal, 
Subsidiary deals, Diversifying 
deals, Hostile deals, Tender 
Offers, Cash or stocks, 
Premium 
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the previous studies that found relation between financial advisors’ 
reputation and acquirer returns on M&A transactions. We use this table to summarise the studies in terms 
of the period of analysis, the number of observations/sample, the methodologies and all variables 
included in the model.  
 
2.5. Hypotheses and testable empirical implications 
As stated in the literature review, recent studies found evidence about the importance of 
the financial advisors’ reputation on each transaction. However, in order to fill the gap 
in the literature regarding the domestic advisors, it is important to test the impact of 
these advisors based on different hypotheses. Our hypotheses are defined as follows: 
H1. M&A transactions with domestic advisors generate greater acquirer returns  
H2. M&A transactions between related businesses and advised by domestic advisors 
generate greater acquirer returns 
H3. M&A transactions with domestic and top-tier advisors generate greater acquirer 
returns  
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3. Data and methodology 
This section presents a description of the data collection, including the criteria for our 
sample and the source of our data, and describes the methodological aspects of our 
study.  
 
3.1. Data 
For our study, we have used a sample of M&A completed transactions worldwide in the 
period 2008-2015, with a total of 1,906 observations. We have chosen this period 
because the most recent study covered the period 1996-2009 and we do not have any 
study after the financial crisis 2007-09. The financial crisis had an impact on the 
economies worldwide and the M&A market was no exception with companies often 
selling part of their business in order to get more cash. During the period of global 
financial crisis, these companies were willing to negotiate deals at market value or 
below across all sectors but the buyers were also limited (Grave et al., 2012). 
To be included in our sample, the transactions must meet the following criteria: 
 Acquisitions that result in a transfer of control where the acquirer’s ownership in 
the target firm increase above 50% after the acquisition (as in Kale et al., 2003; 
Ismail, 2010; Bao and Edmans, 2011) 
 Deal size with at least $1 million (as in Rau, 2000; Ismail, 2010) 
 Bidder and target are listed companies and have share price data (as in Kale et 
al., 2003; Ismail, 2010; Bao and Edmans, 2011) 
 The financial advisors for acquirer and target are publicly disclosed (as in 
Ismail, 2010) 
 Transactions not completed and partial sales (less than 50%) are not considered 
for our sample (Michel et al., 1991; Rau, 2000; Kale et al., 2003; Ismail, 2010) 
We identified 481 transactions from 2008-2015 that satisfy the above selection criteria. 
The data was collected from Zephyr, Google Finance, Yahoo Finance and Thomson 
Reuters. In the Zephyr database we obtained all details about M&A transactions, 
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including the deal size, type of payment, financial advisors, date of announcement, 
completed date, countries of acquirer and target, ownership, target sector, acquirer 
sector and SIC codes. In Google Finance and Yahoo Finance we gathered the historical 
prices and stock data. In Thomson Reuters we can find the Investment Banking League 
Tables
3
 between 2008 and 2015.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
We examined our hypotheses using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In all regressions, 
our dependent variable is the acquirer´s Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). The 
regressions were performed using the statistical software Eviews 7. 
The returns are based on Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the acquirer in the 
5-day event window (-2, +2) where 0 is the announcement day
4
. In our study CARs 
were calculated as the sum of difference between daily returns and the average returns 
of 90 days prior to the announcement date (as in Ismail, 2010).  
Regarding the measure of financial advisors reputation, the earlier studies identified the 
most prestigious investment banks (top 5) as “Bulge bracket”. Rau (2000) changed this 
paradigm and computed the first-tier, second-tier and third-tier with market share. Other 
authors’ approaches differ with the number of banks that are classified as first-tier (8 or 
10). For our study, the advisors are divided by top-tier, non-top-tier and domestic. The 
top-tier advisors include the best eight investment banks every year based on the 
Investment Banking League Tables - Thomson Reuters. The non-top-tier advisors 
include any other advisor and the domestic advisor includes a non-top-tier advisor that 
has worked on a transaction in the same country of its headquarters. As noted by 
Serveas and Zenner (1996), many transaction firms do not hire an advisor because they 
have in-house expertise. In our sample, it is assumed that in-house advisors were used 
when the companies were not advised by any investment bank. 
The basic model is defined as follows: 
                                                          
3
 Investment Banking League Tables summarise the total number and value of deals advised by each 
bank and are used as the standard for measure of reputation (as in Song and Wei, 2013) 
4
 We use a 5-day window because Fuller et al. (2002) found that, after checking the accuracy of the SDC 
announcement date, for about 92.6% of a random sample of 500 acquisitions the date was accurate  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑖 =  𝑐 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐴𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛽9𝑇𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽12𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 481  
Where: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the payment was made in cash, and 0 otherwise 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the payment was made in shares, and 0 
otherwise 
𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer was advised by a domestic 
advisor, and 0 otherwise 
𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer was advised by a top-tier 
advisor, and 0 otherwise 
𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer was advised by a non-top-
tier advisor, and 0 otherwise 
𝐴𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer was advised by its own 
resources, and 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target was advised by a domestic 
advisor, and 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target was advised by a top-tier advisor, 
and 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target was advised by a non-top-tier 
advisor, and 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target was advised by its own resources, 
and 0 otherwise 
𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖= the total transaction value 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖= a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was made between 
related businesses, using SIC 3 digits, and 0 otherwise 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖= the acquirer ownership before the transaction 
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3.3. Heteroscedasticity 
Before the analysis of our regressions, it is important to verify the presence or absence 
of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is defined as a non-constant variance of the 
error term, given the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009). In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are not efficient and, in contrast, when the data is 
homoscedastic, the OLS estimators are unbiased and efficient.  
In order to check the presence of heteroscedasticity, we used the White Test. According 
to the results of the White Test, we reject the null hypothesis at 10% level which means 
that our data is homoscedastic and OLS estimators are efficient.  
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4. Results 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of our model, the number of transactions 
and categories of each advisor, and analysis of regression results, including the tests and 
results of each hypothesis.   
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we use in our sample. 
The data was generated with Eviews as follows:  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Symbol Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Acquirer advised by 
domestic advisor 
Adomestic 0.2869 1.0000 0.0000 0.4528 481 
Acquirer without any 
advisor 
Ainhouse 0.1310 1.0000 0.0000 0.3377 481 
Acquirer advised by 
non-top-tier advisor 
Anontoptier 0.1809 1.0000 0.0000 0.3853 481 
Acquirer advised by 
top-tier advisor 
Atoptier 0.6985 1.0000 0.0000 0.4594 481 
Payment in cash Cash 0.7734 1.0000 0.0000 0.4191 481 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
CAR -0.0016 0.2518 -0.3320 0.0700 481 
Deal size > $1 million Dealsize 0.8150 1.0000 0.0000 0.3887 481 
Inside ownership Ownership 0.0708 1.0000 0.0000 0.1855 481 
Related Business Relatedbusiness 0.8420 1.0000 0.0000 0.3651 481 
Payment in shares Shares 0.4740 1.0000 0.0000 0.4998 481 
Target without any 
advisor 
Tinhouse 0.1185 1.0000 0.0000 0.3235 481 
Target advised by 
domestic advisor 
Tdomestic 0.3368 1.0000 0.0000 0.4731 481 
Target advised by 
non-top-tier advisor 
Tnontoptier 0.4553 1.0000 0.0000 0.4985 481 
Target advised by top-
tier advisor 
Ttoptier 0.6445 1.0000 0.0000 0.4792 481 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of our sample. The period of analysis is 2008-2015 and only 
includes listed firms; transactions where the deal value is at least 1$ million; transactions where the 
acquirer’s ownership in the target firm increases above 50% after the acquisition; and transactions where 
the financial advisors for acquirer and target are publicity disclosed. 
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Table 4 reports the number of transactions advised by top-tier advisors, non-top-tier 
advisors, domestic advisors, and in-house, over the period 2008-2015.  
The table shows the distribution of the merger and acquisitions by year. In 2009 we can 
see the lowest number of transactions (34) during our period of analysis and, in contrast, 
in 2015 we can see the highest number of transactions (89). The majority of the 
transactions were advised by a top-tier advisor; however, most companies were also 
advised by a mixed advisor team, including top-tier advisors and/or non-top-tier and/or 
domestic.  
Table 4. Number of transactions per year and category of advisors 
  
Deals advised by 
Year Number of deals Top-Tier Non-top-tier Domestic In-house 
2008 54 48 27 29 7 
2009 34 29 17 11 8 
2010 60 51 33 27 13 
2011 70 60 34 30 12 
2012 51 41 24 28 12 
2013 58 46 30 28 15 
2014 65 53 41 40 14 
2015 89 76 55 46 16 
Table 4 presents the number of deals per year and category of advisors. In many transactions the merging 
firms hire a mixed team that could include top-tier, non-top-tier and domestic advisors.  
 
4.2. Analysis of regression results 
The empirical analysis was made using ordinary least squares (OLS) in which 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) was considered as the dependent variable. The 
results were carried at 10% and 5% significance level. Table 5 presents the results of 
our model.  
Table 5. Estimation output 
Variables CAR 
Shares 
-0.0137 
(1.84)* 
Cash 
0.0258 
(2.95)** 
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Adomestic 
-0.0003 
(0.04) 
Atoptier 
0.0095 
(1.00) 
Anontoptier 
0.0047 
(0.54) 
Ainhouse 
0.0097 
(0.73) 
Tdomestic 
0.0181 
(1.70)* 
Ttoptier 
-0.0121 
(1.28) 
Tnontoptier 
-0.0182 
(1.63)* 
Tinhouse 
-0.0122 
(0.87) 
Dealsize 
0.0208 
(2.50)** 
Relatedbusiness 
0.0202 
(2.35)** 
Ownership 
-0.0038 
(0.22) 
# obs 481 
𝑅2 (%) 8.51 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
This table reports the ordinary least square regression of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 
acquirer for transactions completed between January 2008 and December 2015. The independent 
variables include dummies for the acquirer advisor tier, the target advisor tier, cash, shares, deal size at 
least $1 million, related business (three-digit SIC code) and inside ownership. T-statistics are in 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * significant at 
10% and ** significant at 5%. 
We consider the model as overall statistically significant because the prob F-statistics 
value is 0.000. With this value, we reject the null hypothesis of insignificance which 
means that the variables we use in our regression can jointly have impact in Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns of the acquirer.       
It is important to note the R-squared value is around 8.51% which means that only 
8.51% of the model is explained by the independent variables and the remaining 
91.49% is attributed to other variables that could be some of reported in the literature. 
Additionally, it is also important to give attention to the key limitations of R-squared, 
such as it does not indicate if a regression model is adequate and cannot determine 
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whether the coefficient estimates are biased. However, if the R-squared value is low but 
the variables are statistically significant we can reach important conclusions about the 
impact of domestic advisors in M&A transactions. The low R-squared value of our 
regression is in line with previous studies (e. g. Bao and Edmans, 2011) which mean 
that M&A returns are difficult to explain. 
 
H1. Transactions with domestic advisors generate greater returns 
Table 6 presents the empirical results of H1 that suggests that the domestic advisors 
have particular expertise in their countries in different factors, such as certain industries, 
the business culture, the regulatory requirements and/or laws.  
Table 6. Estimation output H1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the ordinary least square regression of H1. The dependent variable is the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns for the acquirer and the independent variables include cash, shares, deal size at least 
$1 million, related business (three-digit SIC code), target advised by domestic advisor, acquirer advised 
by domestic advisor and a combination of domestic advisor in both sides (acquirer and target). T-statistics 
are in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * significant 
at 10% and ** significant at 5%. 
Based on the Table 6, we can conclude that the combination of domestic advisor in both 
sides is relevant for the model at 10% significance level and has a negative coefficient. 
Variables CAR 
Cash 
0,0265 
(3.09)** 
Shares 
-0,0132 
(1.81)* 
Adomestic*Tdomestic 
-0,0235 
(1.67)* 
Tdomestic 
0,0158 
(1.97)** 
Adomestic 
0,0058 
(0.65) 
Relatedbusiness 
0,0197 
(2.31)** 
Dealsize 
0,0214 
(2.67)** 
𝑅2 (%) 8.26 
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On the other hand, the coefficient on target domestic advisor individually is positive and 
significant at a 5% level.  
In terms of acquirer domestic advisor individually, the variable is not statistically 
significant and it is impossible to reach a conclusion about its position or negative 
impact on CARs.  
In M&A transactions, the target advisors attempt to get the highest price and, in 
contrast, acquirers expect to buy the target at the lowest price (Song and Wei, 2013). 
Considering the positive impact of domestic advisors on the target side, it could mean 
that the domestic advisors in the target side are important to support the companies to 
negotiate the fair value of their businesses during a merger or acquisition.  
 
H2. Transactions between related businesses and advised by domestic advisors 
generate greater returns 
Table 7 reports the empirical results of H2 that implies that the deals between related 
businesses and advised by domestic advisors generate greater returns than otherwise.  
Table 7. Estimation output H2 
Variables CAR 
Shares 
-0,0137 
(1.87)* 
Cash 
0,0260 
(3.02)** 
Relatedbusiness*Tdomestic*Adomestic 
-0,0254 
(1.82)* 
Tdomestic 
0,0151 
(1.99)** 
Adomestic 
0,0045 
(0.55) 
Dealsize 
0,0213 
(2.66)** 
Relatedbusiness 
0,0234 
(2.70)** 
𝑅2 (%) 8.37 
This table reports the ordinary least square regression of H2. The dependent variable is the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns for the acquirer and the independent variables include cash, shares, deal size at least 
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$1 million, related business (three-digit SIC code), target advised by domestic advisor, acquirer advised 
by domestic advisor and a combination of related business and domestic advisor in both sides (acquirer 
and target). T-statistics are in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is 
represented by * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%. 
 
According to the results of Table 7, the coefficient of the combination between related 
businesses and domestic advisors in both sides (acquirer and target) is negative and 
significant at a 10% level. However, the coefficient of related business individually is 
positive and significant at 5% level and has a positive impact on CARs. Our result is 
consistent with literature (Morck et al., 1990; Ismail, 2010), implying that the acquirer 
returns increases when the target is in a related business and the transactions between 
companies operating in related business are more favourably received by the market 
than diversified acquisitions. 
 
H3. Transactions with domestic and top-tier advisors generate greater returns 
Table 8 presents the empirical results of H3 that implies that a domestic advisor with a 
top-tier advisor (as leader) generates better returns than otherwise.  
Table 8. Estimation output H3 
Variables CAR 
Shares 
-0,0143 
(1.95)* 
Cash 
0,0259 
(3.01)** 
Ttoptier*Tdomestic 
-0,0035 
(0.32) 
Atoptier*Adomestic 
0,0214 
(1.74)** 
Adomestic 
-0,0168 
(1.62) 
Tdomestic 
0,0113 
(1.35) 
Related business 
0,0198 
(2.32)** 
Dealsize 
0,0228 
(2.79)** 
𝑅2 (%) 8.31 
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This table reports the ordinary least square regression of H3. The dependent variable is the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns for the acquirer and the independent variables include cash, shares, deal size at least 
$1 million, related business (three-digit SIC code), target advised by domestic advisor, acquirer advised 
by domestic advisor, combination of target advised by domestic advisor and top-tier advisor, and 
combination of acquirer advised by domestic advisor and top-tier advisor. T-statistics are in parentheses 
under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * significant at 10% and 
** significant at 5%. 
The results of our regression seem to prove that this hypothesis is true only on the 
acquirer side because the coefficient of the combination of acquirer advised by domestic 
advisor and top-tier advisor is positive and significant at a 10% level.  
This result suggests that an acquirer should create a mixed team of advisors with, at 
least, one domestic advisor and one top-tier advisor, in order to maximise their returns.  
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to find evidence about the impact of domestic advisors on 
M&A transactions. The data used for our study just includes listed companies during 
the period 2008-2015. Additionally, this study was also motivated by the presence of a 
gap in the literature regarding the domestic advisors and the period of analysis because 
the most recent study about the impact of reputation advisors on M&A transactions was 
made with the period 1996-2009, and there are no studies that cover the period post-
financial crisis. 
This study relates to the previous studies regarding the reputation advisors (top-tier and 
non-top-tier) and the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of acquirer. Until 2003, all studies 
did not find evidence about the impact of reputation advisors but Kale et al. (2003) 
changed this paradigm and the recent studies have found evidence between reputation 
advisors and the returns earned by the acquirer. 
The results of this study seem to prove that the combination of domestic advisors in 
both sides (target and acquirer) has a negative impact on returns earned by acquirer 
which could represent a bargaining effect on these transactions. However, further 
research is needed to support this conclusion. In terms of domestic advisors 
individually, a target advised by a domestic advisor has a positive impact on returns 
which could be justified by the expertise in the market and/or the importance of these 
advisors to support the firms to get a fair value for their business.  
Additionally, the results seem to prove that transactions between related businesses 
have a positive impact on returns earned by the acquirer. This conclusion is in line with 
relevant literature (Morck et al., 1990; Ismail, 2010).  
One of the main expectations for this study was to test the impact of mixed teams (e.g. 
top-tier and domestic advisor) on returns. Our results seem to prove that an acquirer 
should create a mixed team of advisors with, at least, one domestic advisor and one top-
tier advisor, in order to maximise their returns. 
Our results are also in line with literature in terms of payment suggesting that 
transactions paid in cash generate higher returns than in shares (as in Ismail, 2010). 
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Finally, as a suggestion, future research could focus on the post-global crisis period 
because there is a gap in the literature during this period and most of the firm variables 
would be different than the pre-crisis period.     
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